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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Environmental issues such as recycling, energy
conservation, and resource preservation have been studied by
many academic disciplines because of the obvious importance
and impact the environment has on our lives.

For example,

environmental issues and concerns have been studied by
economists, sociologists, ecologists, and social
psychologists (e.g., Marwell & Ames, 1979; Edney, 1980).
Much of their research frames environmental problems in terms
of social dilemmas.
A social dilemma is characterized as a situation in
which the reasonable individual pursuit of a relatively short
term gain can lead to collective disaster in the long run.
In other words, a social dilemma is a situation that poses an
individual with a conflict between pursuing his/her
individual gain and pursuing the gain of a group to which
he/she belongs (Fleishman, 1988).

Because the pursued gain

is common or accessible to all, individuals can still acquire
and enjoy gains by getting a "free-ride" on the efforts of
others.

Also, an individual that contributes to the
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collective good while others do not, can feel like a
"sucker".

Therefore, it is always best or more profitable

for the individual to act selfishly regardless of what others
do.

However, if everyone adopts this preferable or

"dominant" strategy, no one will be contributing to the
collective good, and collective disaster is inevitable.
Hardin's (1968)

"Tragedy of the Commons" is a classic

example of a social dilemma and the inevitable disaster of
collective selfish behavior.

This model entails a grazing

ground for cattle that is accessible to a group of individual
farmers.

Each farmer can increase their profit by adding

another animal to the collective pasture.

The choice of

adding another animal involves cost in terms of the amount of
pasture consumed and damaged, but these costs are absorbed by
the collective group of farmers and not any one individual
farmer.

Because there is the ability to ignore some of the

costs of their actions, each farmer will be more likely to
keep adding cattle, and since the opportunity exists for all,
that is what they all will do.

However, individual benefits

are likely to be much less than the aggregate costs absorbed
by the over use of the pasture, and eventually the commons
will be destroyed.
Since the dominant strategy in a social dilemma is to
act in one's own self-interest (Hamburger, 1973), early
social dilemma research focused on the "free-rider
hypothesis".

This hypothesis predicts that people are
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independent, rational, profit-seeking decision makers who
will not cooperate (i.e., not help provide or maintain a
collective good).

In essence, this hypothesis predicts that

people will never cooperate in a dilemma situation.

However,

a series of later studies indicated that cooperation in a
dilemma situation was not always zero (Marwell & Ames, 1979,
1980) .
In addition, studies have shown that other variables
also influence the rate of cooperation.
(1962) and Bixentine et al.

Rapoport et al.

(1966) noted a greater degree of

cooperation in two-person dilemma games than in comparable
three- and six-person dilemma games.

An inverse relation

between group size and cooperation was also reported by
Marwell and Schmidt (1972) who studied two- and three-person
uniform dilemma games.
Edney and Harper (1978) studied the effect of
communication on cooperation.

In their study participants

were asked to play a game where they could take or ref rain
from taking points from a common pool that replenished itself
in proportion to the number of points remaining.

Groups that

were allowed to communicate exhibited more communication and
"harvested" more points.

Relatedly, Dawes, Van de Kragt, and

Orbell (1988) suggested that during communication a consensus
of promising to cooperate indicates group identity, and this
group identity either interacts with cooperative commitments
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to make the commitments effective, or may in itself be
sufficient to elicit cooperation.
Several studies compared private with public choice and
found higher rates of cooperation when choice was public
(e.g., Fox & Guyer, 1978).

However, it was noted that the

difference was minimal and may have been greater if
participant's payoffs were significantly larger.

Rapoport

(1987) purported that manipulating the reward structure or
payoffs of the choice should influence cooperation.

Three

paradigms were discussed and labeled "fear plus greed",
fear", and "no greed".

"no

In the fear plus greed paradigm

(i.e., a typical social dilemma), each of the players
receives a sum of money and then may choose independently and
anonymously whether to contribute it to a monetary public
good.

The good is provided to all the players if a specified

number of players or more contributes.

In the "no fear"

paradigm, the opportunity to free-ride is maintained, but
players are protected from having their contribution wasted.
The "no greed" paradigm does not protect players from wasting
their contributions, but does not permit players to freeride.

Whereas it is predicted both the no fear and no greed

paradigms will increase cooperation, the no fear paradigm
should elicit more cooperation since an individual will not
lose or waste their contribution.

However, research results

have shown that only the no greed condition led to greater
cooperation (Simmons et al., cited in Rapoport, 1987).
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Whether a player perceives a loss or gain of their
contribution has been traced to the inherently different
decision formulations (framing) of the various types of
social dilemmas (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).

Although social

dilemmas may be classified in a variety of ways (Messick &
Brewer, 1983), two basic types of social dilemmas are
frequently studied, the "public goods problem"
Chamberlain, 1984) and the "commons dilemma"
1980).

(e.g.,

(e.g., Dawes,

The former involves the individual decision of

whether to contribute to a common resource, and the latter a
decision to take from a common resource.

Examples of the

public goods problem include the decision to contribute to
charity and medical research, and examples of the commons
dilemma include the decision to participate in recycling and
energy conservation efforts.
The public goods and the commons dilemma can be
perceived to provide individuals with a rationally or
economically equivalent decision and outcome (Brewer &
Kramer, 1986).

In a public goods dilemma, people must decide

whether to give up an immediate benefit to themselves (donate
money) for the collective good in the long run.

People faced

with a commons dilemma must decide whether to accept a
smaller benefit for themselves (recycle) in order to sustain
a collective resource and accrue larger benefits in the
future.

Thus, individuals faced with either dilemma will

have less for themselves in the short run if they choose to
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act in the collective interest.

However, prospect theory

(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) suggests that although the two
dilemmas provide the same objective outcome, the decisions of
the two are formulated or framed differently and may not be
regarded as equivalent psychologically.

That is, the initial

framing of a decision may influence the choice preferences of
individuals.
According to prospect theory, a persons utility or value
function is concave above his/her reference points (current
worth) and convex below them.

Thus a value function for

gains is different than a value function for losses.
Therefore, when a decision is initially formulated in terms
of immediate losses, an individual may prefer to select an
alternative that is "risk-seeking".

This means, an

individual will experience "escalation" or the tendency to
not want to accept immediate certain loss and prefer a gamble
that may either result in larger future losses or few if any
losses (Jackson, 1988).

Conversely, when a decision is

initially formulated in terms of immediate gains, an
individual may prefer to select an alternative that is "riskaverse"

(i.e., a sure thing).

Prospect theory would predict

that a public goods problem, which frames the initial
decision in terms of an immediate small loss for uncertain
future benefits, should tend to elicit more selfish (riskseeking) choices than does a commons dilemma which frames the
initial decision in terms of smaller immediate gain to
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prevent detrimental consequences in the future.

Despite the

strong framing effects reported by Kahneman and Tversky
(1984), research regarding the impact of decision framing on
choice behavior (i.e., cooperate/act for the collective good
or defect/act out of self-interest) has provided equivocal
results (Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1986).
Inconsistent framing effects have been argued to stem
from the inability to identify the more or less risky choice
in the game paradigms (i.e., the "give-some" game for the
public goods dilemma and the "take-some" game for the
commons dilemma) used to study social dilemmas (Rutte, Wilke,

& Messick, 1987).

The give-some and take-some games are "N-

person dilemma games" that present groups of people with an
interdependent choice and outcome.

In the give-some game

each person is presented with an initial choice to either
give or not give a specified amount of money back to the
experimenter, and in the take-some game the initial choice is
to take or not take a specified amount from a common pool of
money.

In both games, the cooperative choice results in a

smaller individual gain than the non cooperative choice, but
if all players decide to not cooperate, the individual payoff
is less than if all decided to cooperate.

The games are

interdependent because each persons resultant outcome is
contingent upon the choice of each other group member.
Therefore, the argument for the ambiguity of the meaning for
the amount initially given or taken (i.e., a large or small
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amount can be considered a risky decision), is invalid for
studies using games such as the give-some and take-some game
because players initially give or take a fixed amount.
McDaniel and Sistrunk (1991) attributed the absence of
reliable framing effects to "inadequately established
reference points."

In other words, they postulated that the

instability of a collective payoff over iterated trials of a
dilemma game combined with varying amounts of individual
contributions or withdrawals from the collective resource may
lead to inequivalent gains and losses.

By controlling for

instability and variability, they evidenced reliable framing
effects.

Consistent with prospect theory, they found

individuals were more willing to contribute to a collective
good than to experience some personal loss to avoid the
destruction of an existing collective good.

Also, across

both the public goods and commons dilemmas, individual
member's level of cooperation increased when higher
proportions of others were expected to cooperate.
In contrast to the latter finding of McDaniel and
Sistrunk, earlier work by Fleishman (1988) indicated that
when others were expected to cooperate, individuals would
conform to others' behavior when faced with a commons
dilemma, but act contrary to others' behavior when they could
give to a public good.

Although the results of this study

were also consistent with the framing effects predicted by
prospect theory, Fleishman speculated that ethical
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implications of actions may also influence cooperative
decisions.

He stated "A nonaction [or action] by others may

be sufficient justification for acting inappropriately [or
appropriately] oneself;

[however], when others are not

generous, one can feel morally superior by giving to a
collective effort."

As a result, Fleishman suggested that

ethical/moral orientations should be incorporated into any
model for a social dilemma decision-making process and thus
studied more extensively.
Interestingly, the effect of the ethical implications of
actions had been touched upon in earlier studies on
"moralizing".

Studies on the effects of moralizing (see

review by Dawes, 1981) attempted to see if a sermon about
ethics, group benefit, exploitation, whales, and so on
influenced individual choice behavior in a social dilemma. It
was reported that these sermons increased the rate of
cooperation. Unfortunately, the results of this study are in
an unpublished manuscript and there have been no further
studies to assess why these sermons worked.
Further studies assessing the effects of sermons or
other forms of communicated persuasive appeals on social
dilemma decision-making are needed because of the vast body
of literature on the message-learning approach indicating
such appeals are effective means of influencing people.
According to the message-learning approach,

"persuasive

contexts (e.g., sources and messages) question a recipient's
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initial attitude, recommend the adoption of a new attitude,
and provide incentives {e.g., promises to reduce an
unpleasant drive-state such as fear)

for attending to,

yielding to, and retaining the new rather than the initial
{Petty & Cacioppo, pg. 60, 1981).

attitude"

In regards to

the persuasive context of a message, the type and extent of a
message's characteristics {factors) influence how effective a
message may be in changing one's beliefs, attitudes, and/or
behaviors.
A persuasive message is more effective when it can be
easily comprehended {Gardner, 1966).

The importance of

message comprehension was highlighted by a study by Eagly
{1974).

In this study, participants were presented with one

of three versions of a message advocating that people need
much less sleep than they typically get.

One group of

participants heard a highly comprehensible version {a
reasoned sequence of arguments), a second group heard a
moderately comprehensible version {the sentences were split
in half and randomly put back together so that they
"appeared" to make sense), and a third group heard a poorly
comprehensible version of the message {the words of all the
sentences were completely randomized).

Not surprisingly, the

participants in the high comprehensibility condition were the
most persuaded and recalled the most message arguments.
The likelihood of changing a person's attitude also
increases as the number of arguments increases - sometimes.
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Calder, Insko, and Yandell (1974) conducted a study in which
participants served as "jurors" in a simulated bigamy trial
and heard either one or seven arguments favoring either the
defense or the prosecution.

They found that the side having

the most arguments for its case was the most persuasive.
In contrast, Norman (1976) had participants read a
statement made by either an expert or a physically attractive
source.

Both statements advocated people need less than 8

hours of sleep.

However, half the participants only read the

statement and the other half also read a three and one-half
page message containing six arguments for sleeping less.
Whereas participants agreed with the advocated statement from
the attractive source regardless of whether supporting
arguments were provided, the provision of supporting
arguments increased the persuasive impact of the statement
when it was from an expert.

It was reasoned that an expert

source may be more persuasive than an attractive source
because he/she causes recipients to attend to and think about
the reasons provided for adopting a recommendation.

However,

given an expert source, one should be careful to not provide
too many arguments because this could lead to boredom and
irritation of the recipient (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979b).
Several other message factors have been found to
increase persuasion.

A one-sided message tends to be more

persuasive for people who initially agree with the advocacy
and two-sided messages seem to be more persuasive for people
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who initially disagree (Lumsdaine & Janis, 1953).

A

conclusion to a message usually helps a recipient understand
and remember fully the message arguments and advocacy (e.g.
Hovland & Mandell, 1952); however, if a recipient draws a
conclusion on his/her own, a higher degree of persuasion is
likely than if the conclusion was drawn by the source (e.g.,
Linder & Worchel, 1970).

Miller and Campbell (1959)

purported a "primacy" and "recency" effect of messages on
persuasion.

In other words, their study resulted in

participants being persuaded more by the first and the last
message of a series of messages heard over time.

Finally, a

substantial amount of literature has assessed and
demonstrated the effectiveness of messages that arouse and
reduce fear or emphasize the positive consequences of a
communicator's recommendation.

Such messages are called fear

appeals and positive appeals, respectively.
One of the first studies on fear appeals and attitude
change was the classic experiment by Janis and Feshbach
(1953).

In their study they postulated that fear appeals

entail the implicit use of aroused emotional tension to more
highly motivate recipients to accept reassuring beliefs or
recommendations advocated by a communicator (source).

To

test their hypothesis, they created three similar forms of a
communication recommending good oral hygiene.

Each of the

messages had the same basic information about the causes of
tooth decay and the same recommendations concerning dental
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practices, but differed in the amount of fear-arousing
material that was included.

The high-fear message included

discussions of how poor dental hygiene can lead to diseased
gums, painful toothaches, and spreading infections that may
result in secondary infections causing such things as
arthritic paralysis, kidney damage, or total blindness.

The

moderate message described the same dangers as the high-fear
message but did so in a more detached factual fashion.
Finally, the low-fear message discussed primarily neutral
information about the growth and function of teeth.

Janis

and Feshbach found a marginally significant difference

(~

<

.10) between the three messages that suggested the low-fear
appeal was most effective in influencing the practice of good
oral hygiene.

They argued that the high-fear message was too

disturbing and frightening, and it created defensive
avoidance or the desire to avoid thinking about the issue(s).
Further research on fear appeals found that high-fear
appeals were typically more effective than low or moderate
appeals (Leventhal, 1970).

Janis and Feshbach's findings

were attributed to the fact that although their study's highfear message made recipients uncomfortable about their oral
hygiene, the message did not provide any recommended means of
protection.

Generally, a high-fear appeal will be an

effective means of persuasion if the message describes: 1)
the unfavorableness of the consequences that will occur if
the recommended actions are not adopted; 2) the likelihood
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that the consequences will occur if the recorrunended actions
are not adopted; and 3) the likelihood that the consequences
will not occur if the recorrunended actions are adopted (Hass,
Bagley, & Rogers, 1975; Rogers, 1975; Rogers & Mewborn,
1976) .

In short, a message arouses fear in a person by

questioning the adaptiveness of the current s.ituational
context (Mewborn & Rogers, 1979).
The fear appeals counterpart, the positive appeal, also
has been assumed to be an effective persuasive factor when
similar criteria are met (Jackson, 1988).

That is, a

positive persuasive appeal (i.e., a message that emphasizes
the positive consequences of a corrununicator's recorrunendation)
should be effective in inducing attitude change when the
message describes: 1)

the favorableness of the consequences

that will occur if the recorrunended actions are adopted; 2)
the likelihood that the consequences will occur if the
recorrunended actions are adopted; and 3) the likelihood that
the consequences will not occur if the recorrunended actions
are not adopted.

In contrast to the research on fear

appeals, the amount of literature is minimal and the results
on the effects of positive appeals have been dubious at best.
Some studies on positive appeals have suggested that
they have no consistent effect on attitude and behavior
change (Perkins & Scott, 1986).

In addition, positive

appeals are typically less persuasive than comparable fear
appeals (e.g., Robberson & Rogers, 1988).

However, there are
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studies that have indicated positive appeals may be just as
effective if not more effective than a fear appeal (e.g.,
Evans, 1980).

The unequivocal results regarding positive

appeals should be interpreted with caution because most of
the research seems to have focused on the promotion of health
behaviors (e.g., not smoking and exercise).

Positive appeals

may demonstrate more consistent persuasive effects and/or
greater persuasive effects than a fear appeal in another
context (e.g., a social dilemma).
Since reliable framing effects have been demonstrated
throughout much of the social dilemma literature and there is
a lack of research regarding the effects of persuasive
appeals on dilemma choice and positive appeals in general,
the present study utilized the framework and predictions
outlined by prospect theory to investigate if two appeals
(i.e., negative/fear-arousing/losses oriented and
positive/moral/gains oriented ) may influence cooperative
behavior in a public goods and commons dilemma.

More

specifically, the intent of this study was to assess whether
the content of a message (e.g., fear-arousing, or positive
and ethical/moral as suggested by Fleishman, 1988) that
promotes cooperation will override the payoff structure of a
dilemma that promotes non cooperative behavior, and thus lead
to a higher rate of observed cooperation.
The following was predicted.

1) A fear appeal

emphasizing individual losses would yield higher rates of
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cooperation in the public goods problem (give-some game) .
This is because the public goods decision is initially framed
in terms of an individual accruing a small loss to avoid a
larger loss, and as a result, the individual tends to attempt
to avoid the initial loss by seeking a risk that may result
in either larger or few if any losses.

A fear appeal

emphasizing loss may make the individual more aware of the
potential for the larger losses of a risky decision and thus
more risk-averse (cooperative).

2) Similarly, the positive

appeal would elicit greater cooperation from individuals
confronted with the commons dilemma (take-some game).

In

contrast to the public goods problem, the commons dilemma
initially frames the decision in terms of smaller immediate
individual gain to avoid future detrimental consequences.

As

a result of this framing, individuals tend to be risk-averse
and settle for the "sure thing".

A positive appeal

emphasizing gains may reinforce the notion that gains are
favorable.

CHAPTER 2
METHODS

Participants
Participants were 180 students from Loyola University
Chicago who were enrolled in Psychology 101, and able to
participate in experiments for class credit.

Materials
The design of the study was a 2 x 3 factorial, crossing
type of task {give-some versus take-some) with message type
{positive/gains oriented versus negative/losses oriented
versus no message) .
The following materials were used for the study: a
negative and positive persuasive appeal (Appendices A and B);
give-some and take-some game instructions (Appendices C and
D); and a post-game questionnaire (Appendices E, F, and G).
Both the appeals and the game instructions were developed
through a series of focus groups conducted at the College of
Lake County, Grayslake, Il.
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The persuasive appeals were developed by asking three
classes of psychology students (two introductory classes and
one social psychology class) to rate a series of experiences
as either negative (i.e., an experience resulting in a
personal loss) or positive (i.e., an experience resulting in
a personal gain), and then list as many as three individual
costs or benefits of the experience.

For example, the

students were asked to rate experiences such as fighting and
not fighting with a friend, being drafted and not drafted
into the armed services, and contributing and not
contributing to the maintenance of the environment.

Those

experiences and costs most frequently perceived as negative
were used to create the negative/losses oriented message
appeal and those experiences and benefits most frequently
perceived as positive formed the positive/gains oriented
message appeal.
The game instructions were first developed by the author
and then modified by asking the three classes of students for
feedback on the clarity and comprehension of the
instructions, and the ability to confidently understand and
play the game.

Final modifications were made via suggestions

from various other persons (e.g., professors, other
researchers, and professional writers and editors).
For the give-some game, participants read that they
were to earn as much money as possible.

The amount earned

was contingent upon a decision by each group member.

Every
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group member had to decide to either "keep" or "give" $3
provided by the experimenter.

For each group member that

gave the $3 back to the experimenter, the experimenter
awarded $2 to all group members.
everyone would make $6.

Thus, if everyone gave,

If a group member kept the $3 from

the experimenter, the individual would earn either $3, $5 ,
or $7

for 0, l, and 2 givers respectively.

Table 1 below

illustrates the game's payoff structure.
For the take-some game, participants also read that they
were to earn as much money as possible, and that the amount
earned would be contingent upon a decision by each group
member.

The difference was that every group member was to

decide to "not take" or "take" $3 from a pool of money
provided by the experimenter.

For each group member that did

not take the $3, a dividend of $2 was awarded to all group
members.
$6.

Thus, if everyone did not take, everyone would make

If a group member took the $3 from the pool, the

individual would earn $3, $5, or $7 for 0, 1, and 2 nontakers respectively.
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TABLE 1
PAYOFF MATRIX FOR "THE GIVE-SOME & TAKE-SOME GAMES"
# OF
GIVERS/NO NT AKERS

$TO
KEEPERS/TAKERS

$TO
GIVERS/NO NT AKERS

3

--------

$ 6.00

2

$ 7.00

$ 4.00

1

$ 5.00

$ 2.00

0

$ 3.00

--------

Note that the payoff structures for both game conditions
were identical.

The only difference between the games

was that the give-some game was initially framed in terms of
losses and the take-some game was initially framed in terms
of gains.

Procedure
Participants arrived in groups of three and were
randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions.
Regardless of the condition, each session began with the
experimenter stating that the study addresses influences on
decision making.

In addition, it was stressed that there was

to be no talking until the end of the experiment.

However,

prior to the playing of the game, questions concerning the
game instructions were permitted.
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After these general instructions, the actual experiment
began. One third of the groups received and read either a
positive appeal, a negative appeal, or no appeal at all.

The

appeals were virtually identical in terms of length and
content.

The only difference between the appeals was that

the positive appeal emphasized the individual gains
associated with acting for the collective good, and the
negative appeal emphasized the individual losses associated
with selfish behavior.

When all the participants finished

reading the appeal, the experimenter collected it and
distributed the instructions for the game task.
Half of the participants received the give-some
game instructions and the other half received the take-some
game instructions.

The experimenter read the game

instruction to the players, and then each player was asked to
anonymously make their choice.

However, groups that did not

receive cash payments were told the final outcome of the
game.

Groups receiving payments were not told the outcome of

the game and payments were distributed privately.

In order

to accomplish this, each group member recorded their decision
on a ballot that was coded with a number.

The experimenter

collected the ballots, determined the outcome, and put the
appropriate payments (see below) in envelopes with numbers
corresponding to the ballots and players.
Each session had only about a 17% chance of receiving
cash payoffs.

In order to determine whether a session of
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players was to receive cash for their play, a die was tossed
twice at the conclusion of the game.

If the second roll of

the die matched the first roll, each player received a cash
payment that matched their earned payoff.

No payments were

distributed if the two rolls of the die did not produce
identical numbers.
Participants were also asked to fill out a post-game
questionnaire. Those participants that read a persuasive
appeal received a questionnaire with the following questions:
1) How clear were the game instructions?; 2) How clear were
the game payoffs?; 3) Do you think the game presented an
opportunity to gain or lose money?; 4) What do you think was
the aim of the games decision task?; 5) Did you expect others
to give/not take or keep/take?; 6) How clear was the message
content?; 7) Was it easy or difficult to read the message?;
8) Was there a relationship between the message and the
game?; 9) Did you agree with the message; and 10) How
believable was the message?
Each of the ten questions had a bi-polar, semantic
differential scale ranging from 1 to 7 where 1 was the most
positive {better/more) response and 7 was the most negative
{worse/less) response.

For example question three above had

a rating scale anchored by "gain"

(1) and "lose"

questions one and six were anchored by "clear"
"unclear"

(7).

(7), and

(1) and

In addition to the 10 questions, the

questionnaire also presented a list of ten descriptive
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adjectives for the messages.

Each participant was asked to

pick all the adjectjves that described the message that was
read.

As for the post-game questionnaire for the no message

conditions, it only contained questions 1 - 5 above since the
remaining questions pertained to the messages only.
After all participants completed the questionnaire
and/or payments were distributed, they

were debriefed orally

and with a written description of the study.

When there were

no more questions by the participants, they were thanked and
excused.

CHAPTER 3
RESULTS

Game type (2) by message type (3) analysis of variances
were performed on all the dependent variables described
below.

Since there were no significant main effects or

interactions for all but one dependent variable, the means of
the dependent variables have been provided in Tables 2 and 3
below to clearly illustrate trends in the data.

For those

analyses involving participant's decisions (i.e., defect or
cooperate), the dependent variable was the dichotomous
decision to take (defect) or not take (cooperate) in the
take-some game and keep or give in the give-some game.

TABLE 2
AVERAGE NUMBER OF COOPERATORS
NO
MESSAGE

POSITIVE
MESSAGE

NEGATIVE
MESSAGE

GAME
MEAN

TAKE-SOME

0.80

1.2

1.2

1.07

GIVE-SOME

0.60

1.2

1.3

1.03

MESSAGE MEAN

0.70

1.2

1.25

1.05

GAME TYPE
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Cooperative Decisions

Although there was no significant difference in the rate
of cooperation between the various conditions, Table 2
exhibits an interesting data pattern.
the rate of cooperation (M

= 1.2

and M

Given either message,

= 1.25)

is greater

(though not significantly so) than that in the no message
conditions (M

= 0.70).

That is, it appears the two appeals

(i.e., negative and positive)
degree of cooperation.

promote a somewhat greater

This is consistent with other studies

such as those on the effects of moralizing (see review by
Dawes, 1981).
It

should be noted that both the negative and positive

message conditions exhibited practically the same rate of
cooperation.

This was contrary to expectation and

surprisingly so because chi-square analyses indicated that
the messages were perceived as significantly and correctly
different (i.e., as negative or positive) by the study
participants.
selection

Table 4 illustrates the frequency of the

of adjectives used to describe the messages as

well as the obtained chi-square values.

The negative message

was perceived to be significantly more negative, pessimistic,
fearful, and depressing than the positive message, and the
positive message was seen as significantly more positive, and
optimistic than the negative message.
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TABLE 3
MEAN RATINGS FOR POST-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE ITEM VARIABLES 1-5
QUESTION

GAME
TYPE

NO
MESSAGE

Clarity of
Grune
Instructions
(Clear vs.
Not Clear)

TAKE-SOME

3.13

2.30

2.17

2.53

GIVE-SOME

2.50

2.17

1.96

2.21

MESSAGE
MEAN

2.82

2.24

2.07

2.37

Clarity of
Grune
Payoffs
(Clear vs.
Not Clear)

TAKE-SOME

2.70

2.20

2.07

2.32

GIVE-SOME

2.30

1.80

2.03

2.04

MESSAGE
MEAN

2.50

2.00

2.05

2.18

Perceived
Opportunity
oft Grune
(Gain vs.
Lose)

TAKE-SOME

2.77

2.77

2.67

2.74

GIVE-SOME

2.23

2.40

2.40

2.34

MESSAGE
MEAN

2.50

2.61

2.54

2.54

Perceived
Aimof
Grune
(Gain vs.
lose)
Expected
Decision of
Others
(Give/Not
Take vs.
Keep/Take)

TAKE-SOME

2.97

3.67

3.67

3.45

POSITIVE NEGATIVE
MESSAGE MESSAGE

GAME
MEAN

GIVE-SOME

2.80

2.93

3.13

2.95

MESSAGE
MEAN

2.89

3.30

3.25

3.20

TAKE-SOME

3.73

2.80

3.50

3.34

GIVE-SOME

3.23

3.60

3.13

3.32

MESSAGE
MEAN

3.48

3.20

3.32

3.33
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)
MEAN RATINGS FOR POST-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE ITEM VARIABLES 6-10
QUESTION

Clarity of
Message
Content

GAME
TYPE

NO
MESSAGE

TAKE-SOME

----

2.57

2.67

2.62

GIVE-SOME

----

2.77

2.47

2.62

MESSAGE
MEAN

----

2.67

2.57

2.62

----

2.37

2.56

2.46

----

2.26

2.10

2.18

----

2.32

2.33

2.32

----

2.47

2.67

2.57

----

2.27

2.20

2.24

MEAN

----

2.37

2.44

2.40

TAKE-SOME

----

3.47

2.87

3.17

GIVE-SOME

----

2.93

2.83

2.88

----

3.20

2.85

3.02

----

3.37

2.80

3.08

----

3.20

2.80

3.00

----

3.29

2.80

3.04

Difficulty of TAKE-SOME
Message
Reading
GIVE-SOME
MESSAGE
MEAN

Perceived
Relationship TAKE-SOME
Between
Message an GIVE-SOME
and Grune
MESSAGE

Agreeance
with the
Message

MESSAGE
MEAN

Believability TAKE-SOME
of the
Message
GIVE-SOME
MESSAGE
MEAN

POSITIVE NEGATIVE
MESSAGE MESSAGE

GAME
MEAN
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Manipulation

Checks and

Expectations

The comparability of the games and messages was assessed
by measuring the perceived similarities among the games and
among the messages.

The variables assessed were the clarity

of the game instructions, the clarity of the game payoff
structures, the perceived· opportunity of the game (i.e., the
opportunity to gain or lose money), the perceived aim of the
game's decision task, the expected choice of the other
players, the clarity of the message content, the
understandability of the message, the perceived relationship
between the game and message, and the extent of message
acceptance and credibility.
The game instructions were significantly less clear
(E(l,54)=4.25, £ < .02) in the no message conditions than in
either of the message conditions. However, the game
instructions were about equally clear in the positive message
condition (M = 2.24) and the negative message condition (M =
2.07).

This suggests that the messages may have enhanced the

clarity of the instructions by providing real life examples
of the game.
Although none of the remaining manipulation checks
produced significant outcomes, several mentionable trends and
data patterns emerged. Table 3 above contains the means of
these variables for each experimental condition.
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TABLE 4
PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE PERSUASIVE APPEALS

PERCEPTION (ADJECTIVE)

POSITIVE
MESSAGE
(% YES)

NEGATIVE
MESSAGE
(% YES)

CHISQUARE
VALUE
(DF =1)

Message seen as positive

77%

39%

17.34**

Message seen as negative

10%

24%

4.01*

Message seen as moralistic

40%

56%

3.03

Message seen as optimistic

58%

24%

14.71 **

Message seen as pessimistic

3%

24%

10.63**

Message seen as fearful

5%

22%

7.42**

Message seen as ethical

47%

41%

0.43

Message seen as enlightening

13%

15%

0.09

Message seen as persuasive

55%

47%

0.68

Message seen as depressing

2%

27%

15.74**

NOTE:

'*' signifies

E

< .05 and '**'

signifies

E

< .01

The game payoffs were marginally less clear in the no
message conditions (.Ell,54)=2.48,

E

<.09).

Again, it seems

as if the messages may have made the game instructions easier
to understand.

Also, the give-some game payoffs were rated

as slightly more clear (M
payoffs (M

= 2.32).

= 2.04)

than the take-some game

This may be attributed to the fact that
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the give-some game instructions were less convoluted.

That

is, the take-some game instructions included a reference to a
"pool" of money/resources that grew with cooperative choices
and diminished with defective choices, and the give-some game
did not.
The give-some game was perceived as presenting a
marginally greater opportunity to gain money (E(l,54)=2.80,
<

.10).

E

Also, the aim of the give-some game's decisional

task was seen as that of acquiring gains (E(l,54)=3.57, E <
These trends support prospect theory (Kahneman &

.06).

Tversky, 1984) which states that the give-some game's initial
decision is framed as an opportunity to avoid a larger loss
(i.e., gain money) by incurring an initial small loss.
As for the expected choice of the other players, players
in both game conditions had a slight expectation (M = 3.34
and M = 3.32) of cooperative behavior (i.e., not take or
give) .

This

contradicts prospect theory in that the framing

of the take-some game should lead to less cooperative
behavior as thus an expectation of less cooperation from
others.
In regards to the message variables, the positive
message (M = 2.67) and the negative message (M = 2.57) had
approximately the same level of content clarity
(E(l,36)=0.14,

E

< .70).

(E(l,36)=1.56,

E

< .21) with the negative message

Also, players tended to agree more
(M = 2.85)
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than the positive message (M

= 3.2).

Finally, the negative

message (M = 2.8) was rated as more credible (E(l,36)=3.61,
<

.06) than the positive message (M

= 3.29).

The latter two

findings are consistent with previous research regarding the
effect of persuasive appeals.

E

CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION

Although the main predictions of this study were not
borne out, there was a trend for a main effect of message
type.

Both the negative and positive message conditions had

approximately the same rate of cooperation, and this level of
cooperation was slightly greater than that in the no message
conditions.

This finding is consistent with the literature

on the effects of positive, moralistic message appeals (see
review by Dawes, 1981) and fear-arousing appeals (e.g.,
Rogers and Mewborn, 1976).

Significant results supporting

previous research may have been obtained if some of this
studies limitations could have been controlled.
First, there may have been a problem with statistical
power.

Although, 10 observations per condition is the

recommended minimum for having adequate statistical power to
detect a significant difference (Lipsey, 1990), more
observations (e.g., 20) may have elicited significant
findings.
Second, there was minimal ecological validity.

That is,

there were only three people per group and the group members
32
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were playing with a small amount of money that was not their
own.

In actuality, a social dilemma would entail much larger

groups and greater amounts of personal money or resources.
More participants per group and larger sums of money for the
game's payoffs may have produced significant differences
between the study conditions.
Third, contrary to the participants of other studies
(e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), participants of this study
did not perceive the games as presenting different
opportunities and goals.

This may be attributed to the fact

that this study utilized a one-shot methodology.

That is,

the participants of this study only played the game once.
Social dilemma studies typically use a methodology that
includes several iterations of the game (e.g., Brewer, &
Kramer, 1986).

Therefore, it may be necessary for

participants to play several iterations of the game before
they fully understand it and an effect can be pulled.
Relatedly, dilemma games usually start with the players
either receiving some money (the give-some game) or seeing
some common resource of money or points (the take-some game) .
In this study, the players started with hypothetical money
for both games, and only received actual money for a "lucky"
role of a die.

Tangible materials and rewards may be

influential factors in obtaining a framing (game) effect.
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Finally, a message effect may not have been obtained
because of the content of this study's messages.

Fishbein

and Ajzen (1975 and 1981) have argued that in order to change
behavior, you need to change the specific beliefs that
underlie the behavior.

There is no evidence indicating that

this study's participants had their beliefs changed about
anything, much less the beliefs that were relevant and
important to game behavior.
In sum, although there was a failure to find evidence
supporting the effects of decision framing and persuasive
appeals on choice behavior in a social dilenuna, there was an
interesting message trend that emerged.

Further studies with

less methodological flaws need to be conducted in order to
more thoroughly and accurately assess the effect of
persuasive message appeals on the choice behavior in social
dilenunas.

APPENDIX A
NEGATIVE MESSAGE APPEAL
To Cooperate or Not. That is the Question

Cooperation is one of the first lessons

that every

child is taught as early as kindergarten or the first grade.
Ironically, it is a behavior that many neglect throughout
their lives or abandon later in life.

One explanation for

this neglect of cooperative behavior is that people are not
aware of the ramifications associated with a lack of
cooperation.

The following are four examples of how a lack

of cooperation leads to extremely likely individual losses.
1)

A confrontation among friends or family members is often

the result of a lack of cooperation.

When two or more people

are unwilling to work together to reach an understanding or a
compromise, emotions run high and tempers begin to flare.
Everyone involved will most likely suffer some type of loss.
For example, fights usually result in one or more of the
following: the end of a great friendship or relationship;
regret; the loss of the ability to maintain self-
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control/reason, and a decrease in self-respect and the
respect of mutual friends or others.
2)

"War," an extremely large-scale confrontation, is also

the result of non-cooperative behavior and,

obviously, the

individual consequences are more severe than a two or three
person quarrel.
The loss of one's life is highly probable during war
time as is the loss of family and friends.

Also, the

militarized individual must give up his/her freedom, and
dignity and is often required to engage in activities that
defy all of his/her ideologies, morals, values, and beliefs.
For those fortunate enough to physically and mentally survive
combat duty during a war, there is still the irreplaceable
loss of time.

That is to say, the loss of time that could

have been spent enjoying family and friends, pursuing
interests, and obtaining goals.
3)

The quality of our environment is also contingent upon

cooperation. This is because the maintenance, preservation
and improvement of the environment takes consideration,
contributions, and efforts from all of society's members.
Obviously, there has not been enough cooperation to date as
is evidenced by the current state of the environment.

Every

individual member of society has experienced a gradual yet
steady loss in the quality of air and water.

Additionally,

oxygen-producing rain forests are being destroyed, the ozone
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is depleting, resources are becoming exhausted, and landfills
and dumps are reaching maximum capacity as new sites are
becoming scare.

All of these environmental conditions are

undoubtedly health hazards for all inhabitants of the planet.
In addition to the obvious health hazards,

each

individual that does not help maintain the environment incurs
many psychological losses. Many people often report that a
lack of involvement and concern results in decreased selfesteem, self-respect, and social approval.
4)

Advances in medicine, and the alleviation of social

problems also require cooperative efforts from all members of
society.

If resources such as funding and manpower for

research institutions and charitable organizations are
insubstantial or unavailable, every individual has an
increased chance of suffering tremendous personal losses.
The most prominent and detrimental losses are to advances in
medicine, and technology.

These losses consequently lead to

a less comfortable life and a possible premature death.
For those fortunate enough to avoid chronic or terminal
illness, the failure to contribute to research institutions
and charitable organizations entails psychological losses.
For example, not contributing has been attributed to the lack
or loss of empathy (the ability to identify with another) and
the lack of sympathy (the ability to share anothers ideas and
feelings).

Decreased feelings of satisfaction, pride,
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involvement, and concern for others have also been linked not
contributing.
These examples illustrate that a lack of cooperation
definitely leads to individual losses.

If people were more

aware of these losses, cooperation among people might be
enhanced.

APPENDIX B
POSITIVE MESSAGE APPEAL
To Cooperate or Not. That is the Question
Cooperation is one of the first lessons that every child
is taught as early as kindergarten or the first grade.
Ironically, it is a behavior that many neglect throughout
their lives or abandon later in life.

One explanation for

this neglect of cooperative behavior is that people are not
aware of the positive consequences associated with
cooperation.

The following are four examples of how

cooperation leads to extremely likely individual gains.
1)

The avoidance of a confrontation with friends or family

members is often the result of cooperation.

When two or more

people are willing to work together to reach an understanding
or a compromise, emotions remain stable and tempers do not
flare.

Each individual involved will most likely receive

some type of gain.

For example, avoiding a fight usually

results in one or more of the following: the maintenance or
strengthening of a great friendship or relationship, peace
and understanding, the ability to maintain or gain self-
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control/reason, and an increase in self-respect and the
respect of mutual friends or others.
2)

Avoiding

11

war

11

an extremely large scale confrontation,

is also the result of cooperative behavior and, obviously,
the individual rewards or "gains" are greater than those
associated with avoiding a two or three person quarrel.
Sparing one's life and those of family and friends are
gains resulting from the avoidance of war.

Also, an

individual civilian (as opposed to a serviceman) is able to
maintain his/her freedom and dignity, and advance his/her
ideologies, morals, values, and beliefs.
the gain of time.

Lastly, there is

That is to say, the gain of time spent

enjoying family and friends, pursuing interests, and
obtaining goals.
3)

The quality of our environment is also contingent upon

cooperation. This is because the maintenance, preservation
and improvement of the environment takes consideration,
contributions, and efforts from all of society's members.
Obviously, a better environment results in greater physical
health for all.

If enough is done by all, every individual

member of society will experience a gradual yet steady
increase in the quality of air and water.

In addition,

oxygen producing rain forests will flourish, the ozone will
stop depleting, natural resources will be plentiful, and
landfills and dumps will not occupy inhabitable land.

41
In addition to the obvious health gains, each individual
that helps maintain the environment experiences many
psychological gains.

Many people often report that

involvement and concern results in greater self-esteem, selfrespect, and social approval.
4)

Advances in medicine and the alleviation of social

problems also require cooperative efforts from all members of
society.

If resources such as funding and manpower for

research institutions and charitable organizations are
substantial or available, every individual has an increased
chance of acquiring tremendous personal gains.

The most

prominent and beneficial gains are advances in medicine and
technology.

These gains consequently lead to a more

comfortable life and the avoidance of a possible premature
death.
For those fortunate enough to avoid chronic illness or
disease, contributions to research institutions and
charitable organizations entails definite psychological
gains.

For example, contributing has been attributed to the

acquisition of empathy (the ability to identify with another)
and the acquisition of sympathy (the ability to share
anothers ideas and feelings). Increased feelings of
satisfaction, pride, involvement, and concern for others have
also been linked to contributing.
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These examples illustrate that
individual gains.

cooperation leads to

If people were more aware of these gains,

cooperation among people might be enhanced.

APPENDIX

C

GIVE-SOME GAME INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions for Playing "The Give-Some Game"
The game that you are about to play is a 3-person game
of choice that is characterized by a high degree of
interdependence.

This means that the choice you make will

effect the outcomes of the other players and that the choices
of the other players will effect your outcome.
The object of the game is to make as much money as you
can.

The game starts out with the experimenter giving each

player $3.

Then, each player has two choices.

The player

may decide to keep the $3, or he/she may give the $3 back to
the experimenter.

If the player returns the $3, the

experimenter will then give $2 to each player in the

game.

Thus, if all three players keep the $3, then each player gets
a $3 payoff.

However, if all three players give the money

back to the experimenter, then each player gets $6. Thus,
players' payoffs are interdependent - they depend on the
behavior of both the individual player and the behavior of
the other players in the game.

The payoff matrix below

specifies all of the possible payoff combinations for the
game.
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Payoff

Matrix

for

"The

Give

Some

Game"

$ To Keepers

$ To Givers

3

------

$ 6.00

2

$ 7.00

$ 4.00

1

$ 5.00

$ 2.00

0

$ 3.00

------

Number of
Givers

In the event that 2 players "give" and 1 player "keeps," the
2 players would receive a payoff of $4 (2 givers X $2), and
the player would receive a payoff of $7 (2 X $2 + $3).
Notice the two following properties of the payoff
matrix: 1) as previously mentioned, the individual payoff for
all players choosing to keep is less than the individual
payoff for all players choosing to give; and 2) the
individual payoff for keeping is greater than the individual
payoff for becoming an additional giver. Though the choice to
keep results in a greater individual payoff, all players
deciding to keep will provide everyone a smaller payoff than
all players deciding to give.
When making your decision, you will not be able to
communicate with the other players.

Therefore, your decision

will have to be based on the amount of money you desire and
the expected choices of the other players.
To cast your decision, please write either give or keep
on the numbered slip of paper that has been provided for you,
and then hand it to the experimenter.

Note and remember the
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number on the slip of paper because after the experimenter
determines the payoffs, your payoff will be put in an
envelope that is marked with a number that corresponds to the
number on the slip.

This procedure will assure that none of

the other players will know the choice you made.
Take as long as you need to make your decision and
please feel free to ask the experimenter any questions that
you may have.

APPENDIX D
TAKE-SOME GAME INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions for Playing "The Take-Some Game"
The game that you are about to play is a 3-person game
of choice that is characterized by a high degree of
interdependence.

This means that the choice you make will

effect the outcomes of the other players and that the choices
of the other players will effect your outcome.
The object of the game is to make as much money as you
can.

The game starts out with the experimenter having a pool

of money.

Each player in the game has two choices.

The

player can either take $3 from the pool or he/she can decide
not to take the $3.

For each player that does not take the

$3, the pool grows and pays a $2 dividend to each player.
Thus, if all three players take $3, then they each make $3 in
the game.

However, if all three players decide not to take

the $3, then each player gets $6 (3 non-takers X $2
dividend).

Thus, players' payoffs are interdependent - they

depend on the behavior of both the individual player and the
behavior of the other players in the game.

The payoff matrix

below specifies all of the possible payoff combinations for
the game.
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Payoff

Matrix

for

"The

Take

Some

Game"

$ To Takers

$ To
Non-takers

3

------

$ 6.00

2

$ 7.00

$ 4.00

1

$ 5.00

$ 2.00

0

$ 3.00

------

Number of
Non-takers

In the event that 2 players decide to "not take" and 1
player decides to take, the two players would receive a $4
payoff (2 non-takers X $2 dividend), and the 1 player would
receive a $7 payoff (2 X $2 + $3).
Notice the following properties of the payoff matrix: 1)
as previously mentioned, the individual payoff for all
players choosing to take is less than the individual payoff
for all players choosing not to take; and 2) the individual
payoff for taking is greater than the individual payoff for
becoming an additional non-taker.

Though the choice to take

results in a greater individual payoff, all players deciding
to take will provide everyone a smaller payoff than all
players deciding not to take.
When making your decision, you will not be able to
communicate with the other players. Therefore, your decision
will have to be based on the amount of money you desire and
the expected choices of the other players.
To cast your decision, please write either take or not
take on the numbered slip of paper that has been provided for
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you, and then hand it to the experimenter.

Note and remember

the number on the slip of paper because after the
experimenter determines the payoffs, your payoff will be put
in an envelope that is marked with a number that corresponds
to the number on the slip.

This procedure will assure that

none of the other players will know the choice you made.
Take as long as you need to make your decision and
please feel free to ask the experimenter any questions that
you may have.

APPENDIX E
POST-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE GIVE-SOME GAME
Post-Game Questionnaire
Please answer the following questions that pertain to
the game you just played and the message you read earlier.
1. How clear were the game instructions?
Very clear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not clear

2. How clear were the payoffs for the choices/decisions?
Very clear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not clear

3. Do you think the game presented the opportunity to lose
money or gain money?
Lose

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Gain

4. What do you think was the aim of the game's decision task?
Restrict losses 1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Acquire gains

5. Did you expect other players to give or keep?
Give 1

2

3

4

5

6
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7

Keep
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6. How clear was the content of the message?
Very Clear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not Clear

7. Was it easy or difficult to read the message?
Difficult 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Easy

8. Do you feel that there was a relationship between the
message and the game?
No

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Yes

9. Did you agree with the message you read?
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Disagree

10. How believable was the message you read?
Believable 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not Believable

11. Please circle the characteristics that you feel best
describes the message you read (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY) .
A. Positive
B. Negative
c. Moralistic

D. Optimistic
E. Pessimistic
F. Fearful

G. Ethical
H. Enlightening
I. Persuasive
J. Depressing

APPENDIX F
POST-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE TAKE-SOME GAME
Post-Game Questionnaire
Please answer the following questions that pertain to
the game you just played and the message you read earlier.
1. How clear were the game instructions?
Very clear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not clear

2. How clear were the payoffs for the choices/decisions?
Very clear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not clear

3. Do you think the game presented the opportunity to lose
money or gain money?
Lose

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Gain

4. What do you think was the aim of the decision task?
Restrict losses 1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Acquire gains

5. Did you expect other players to take or not take?
Take 1

2

3

4

5

6

51

7

Not Take

52
6. How clear was the content of the message?
Very Clear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not Clear

Comment{s):
7 . Was it easy or difficult to read the message?

Difficult 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Easy

Comment{s):

8. Do you feel that there was a relationship between the
message and the game?
No

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Yes

9. Did you agree with the message you read?
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Disagree

10. How believable was the message you read?
Believable 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not Believable
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11. Please circle the characteristics that you feel best
describes the message you read (YOU MAY CIRCLE MORE THAN ONE
RESPONSE).

A. Positive
B. Negative
c. Moralistic
D. Optimistic
E. Pessimistic

F. Fearful
G. Ethical
H. Enlightening
I. Persuasive
J. Depressing

APPENDIX G
POST-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE NO MESSAGE CONDITIONS
Post-Game Questionnaire
Please answer the following questions that pertain to
the game you just played.
1. How clear were the game instructions?
Very clear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not clear

2. How clear were the payoffs for the choices/decisions?
Very clear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not clear

3. Do you think the game presented the opportunity to lose
money or gain money?
Lose

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Gain

4. What do you think was the aim of the decision task?

Restrict losses 1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Acquire gains

5. Did you expect other players to take or not take?

Take/Keep 1

2

3

4

5

Comment(s):

54

6

7

Not Take/Give
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